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JUNE 1980
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
CURRENT TRENDS IN THE TREATMENT OF THE
SECTION
501(c)(6) BUSINESS LEAGUE EXEMPTION
by
Donald F. Jacobs*
Section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Code) pro-
vides that an organization described in subsection (c) shall be exempt
from federal income taxation unless such exemption is denied under
section 502 or 503 Section 501(c)(6) provides such an exemption for
"[b]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards
of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not administering
a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual."'
The exemption for business leagues has been the subject of consid-
erable litigation since its original enactment in 1913, and the recent
trend in case law and revenue rulings has been to restrict the expan-
sion of the exemption.' This movement toward limiting the exemption
is reflected in two relatively recent decisions, Associated Master Bar-
bers & Beauticians of America, Inc. v. Commissioner" decided by the
United States Tax Court in 1977 and National Muffler Dealers Associ-
ation, Inc. v. United States' handed down by the United States Su-
preme Court in March 1979.
In Master Barbers, the Tax Court upheld the revocation by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) of the exempt sta-
tus under section 501(c)(6) of a nonprofit corporation.' The petitioner
*B.A. 1969, University of Maryland; J.D. 1973, Villanova University Law School;
L.L.M. 1979, (Taxation) University of Florida; Associate van den Berg, Gay & Burke,
Orlando, Florida.
I.R.C. § 501(a).
L .R.C. § 501(c)(6).
3 R. De Witt, The Changing Scenario in Exempt Organizations, 22 S. CAL. TAX
INST. 593, 614 (1970).
4 69 T.C. 53 (1977).
440 U.S. 472 (1979), affg 565 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977).
669 T.C. at 70.
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organization originally had been determined to be exempt in 1927 un-
der a predecessor statute of section 501(c)(6). The revocation was ef-
fected by a determination letter dated February 28, 1973 and was to
be effective for the petitioner's fiscal year beginning October 1, 1966.'
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) determined defi-
ciencies in the petitioner's federal income taxes for its fiscal years
1967, 1970, 1971 and 1973.1 The court concluded that petitioner was
engaged in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit9
and that its activities were directed to the performance of particular
services for individual members of the organization. Therefore, the
court sustained the Service's determination revoking the petitioner's
exempt status under section 501(c)(6) for the years in question and
further held that the organization was taxable as a corporation under
section 11 of the Code.'0
In National Muffler the United States Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
which had affirmed dismissal of the petitioner organization's com-
plaint." The complaint sought a refund of federal income tax based on
the allegation that the petitioner was entitled to exemption as a busi-
ness league under section 501(c)(6). 2 In the majority opinion delivered
by Justice Blackmun, the high court held that the trade association,
which had limited its membership to dealers franchised by Midas In-
ternational Corporation (Midas) and had restricted its activities to the
Midas muffler business, was not improving the business conditions of
one or more lines of business and therefore, was not entitled to the
exemption from federal income tax provided by section 501(c)(6)."
In order to better understand the significance of the aforemen-
tioned cases, it is first advisable to undertake an analysis of the legisla-
tive history and case law development of the business league exemp-
tion. The history of this exemption is as old as the federal income tax
itself, dating back as it does to the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913."
Legislative history concerning the exemption is scanty, and there are
no congressional committee reports which discuss the reasons for its
inclusion in the 1913 Act. 5 The only documented legislative history
which is relevant consists of two statements in letter form directed to
the Senate Finance Committee prepared by the Chamber of Com-
I Id. at 55.
'Id. at 54.
1 Id. at 69.
10 Id. at 70.
" 440 U.S. at 489.
"Id. at 475.
"Id. at 487-89.
"Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 11 G(a), 38 Stat. 114 (1913) (now I.R.C. §
501(c)(6).
5440 U.S. at 478 n.8.
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merce of the United States of America16 and the American Warehouse-
men's Association, 7 which statements are dated May 12, 1913 and
May 23, 1913 respectively.
Both statements requested that the tariff bill then before the Fi-
nance Committee be amended to create a specific exemption from
federal income taxation for commercial organizations not organized
for profit. 8 According to the Chamber's argument, the proposed in-
come tax bill was broader in scope than the Corporation Excise Tax of
1909. The 1909 Act was limited in application to "every corporation,
joint-stock company, or association organized for profit and having
capital stock represented by shares,"'" thus excluding by definition
nonprofit civic and commercial organizations. In contrast to the lan-
guage of the 1909 Act, the version of the bill then before the Finance
Committee required taxation of net "income arising or accruing from
all sources ... to every corporation, joint-stock company or associa-
tion.., no matter how created or organized." It was argued that appli-
cation of familiar rules of statutory construction to the bill in question
would compel courts enforcing the proposed income tax statute to give
effect to the plain meaning of the statutory language and to construe
narrowly any exemptions. Therefore, despite congressional intent to
the contrary, as manifested in debate, courts would be constrained to
bring nonprofit commercial organizations within the purview of the
statute.
20
In support of the plea to amend the bill by adding "commerical
organizations not organized for profit" to the bill's list of exempt cor-
porations and associations, the Chamber's Secretary eloquently wrote:
The commercial organization of the present day is not organized for
selfish purposes, and performs broad patriotic and civic functions. In-
deed, it is one of the most potent forces in each community for the
improvement of physical and social conditions.... [Ilt is not in the nar-
row sense of advantage to the individual, but in the broad sense of
building up the trade and commerce of the community as a whole and
... what is expended in improving the city in which it is situated and
the conditions of its inhabitants will inevitably redound to the benefit of
its commercial interests.
Such organizations, therefore, bear a relation to the communities in
which they are situated similar to those of savings banks, charitable and
educational associations .... The businessmen who make up their mem-
bership are subject to the tax. The dues that they pay annually to these
Briefs and Statements on H.R. 3321 filed with the Senate Committee on Finance,
63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 2001 (1913).
I7 d. at 2040.
i Id. at 2001, 2040.
19 Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
Briefs and Statements on H.R. 3321, supra note 16.
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associations performing services which are in the main of a public char-
acter are in a sense a tax.21
Without formal explanation, but in apparent response to the afore-
mentioned requests, Congress enacted as part of the Tariff Act of Oc-
tober 3, 1913, section II G(a) (the predecessor of present section
501(c)(6)) a provision that the income tax would not apply to "[b]usi-
ness leagues, nor to chambers of commerce or boards of trade, not
organized for profit and no part of the net income of which inures to
the benefit of the private stockholder or individual.22 No documented
explanation was offered by Congress for the use of language more nar-
row than that proposed by the Chamber of Commerce.23
To the uninitiated, a reading of the naked language of both the
original and current versions of section 501(c)(6) may appear to be a
list of organizations each separate and distinct from one another with
each having its own independent body of case law and regulatory em-
bellishment. Whatever the intention of the Sixty-third Congress in
passing the exemptions as part of the 1913 Act, it is clear, notwith-
standing certain subtle definitional distinctions," that the development
of the original three entities as legal concepts (i.e. business league,
chambers of commerce and boards of trade), has arisen from the same
line of cases in a mutual and contemporaneous fashion. In practice,
legal principles applicable to one have generally been applied to all.2"
It is significant to note that neither in its original form nor in any
subsequent amendments or re-enactments has the pertinent statute de-
fined the term "business league.- 2 6 Moreover, the term was not men-
I ld. at 2002.
22 Tariff Act of Oct. 3,1913, ch. 16, § II G(a), 38 Stat. 114 (now I.R.C. § 501 (c)(6)).
13440 U.S. at 478.
24 board of trade: "in the United States, a body of men appointed for the
advancement and protection of business interests. Cf. chamber of com-
merce.
chamber of commerce: -[A] board or association to protect the interests
of commerce, chosen from among the merchants and traders of a city.
The term chamber of commerce is by some distinctively used of the bo-
dies that are entrusted with the protection of the general commercial in-
terests, esp. in connection with foreign trade and board of trade for those
dealing primarily with local commerce."
440 U.S. at 480 n.10, (quoting, WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 245,
366 (1911)).
25 See 440 U.S. at 478-89; Milwaukee Ass'n of Commerce v. United States, 72 F. Supp.
310 (E.D. Wis. 1947); Evanston-North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F.2d
375 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Rev. Rul. 73-411, 1973-2 C.B. 180.
26 See Tariff Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 11 G(a), 38 Stat. 114; Revenue Act of 1916,
ch. 463 § 11(a), 39 Stat. 766; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 212, § 231(7), 40 Stat. 1076;
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 231(7), 42 Stat. 253; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §
231(7), 43 Stat. 282; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 231(7), 44 Stat. 40; Revenue Act of
1928, ch. 852, § 103(7), 45 Stat. 813 (real estate boards added); Revenue Act of 1932, ch.
[Vol. 2:1
BUSINESS LEAGUE EXEMPTION
tioned in either of the statements submitted to the Senate Finance
Committee in 1913.2" The term is susceptible to being broken down to
its components for purposes of definition. "Business" has been de-
scribed as very comprehensive and embracing everything about which
a person can be employed. "League" has been defined as "an agree-
ment or covenant between two or more persons for the accomplish-
ment of some purpose by their cooperation. '"28 However, in the ab-
sence of congressional initiative, the task of defining the term "busi-
ness league" fell upon the shoulders of the Solicitor (now Commission-
er) of Internal Revenue.
Though amended several times in the ten years between its initial
appearance in 1919 and 1929,29 the pertinent regulation presently de-
fines the term "business league" as "an association of persons having
some common business interest, the purpose of which is to promote
such common interest and not to engage in a regular business of a kind
ordinarily carried on for profit."2" The regulation further describes it
as an organization of the same general class as a chamber of commerce
or board of trade, and whose activities should be directed to the im-
provement of business conditions of one or more lines of business, not
the performance of particular services for individuals. An association
furnishing information to prospective investors to enable them to make
sound investments, is not a business league; nor is a stock or commod-
ity exchange a chamber of commerce, or a board of trade within the
meaning of section 501(c)(6). Organizations otherwise exempt from tax
under this section are still taxable upon their unrelated business taxable
income.3' The present language of the regulation has remained virtual-
ly unchanged since 1929 despite the many re-enactments and one
amendment to the statute.32
Since its inception in 1913, section 501(c)(6) and its predecessors
have only been amended twice, and then only to add to the list of
organizations qualifying for the exemption.3" Partially at the request of
the Philadelphia Real Estate Board (an organization consisting of li-
censed real estate brokers and salesmen whose purpose was to promote
and facilitate business through the dissemination of information re-
209, § 103(7), 47 Stat. 193; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 101(7), 48 Stat. 700; Rev-
enue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 101(7), 49 Stat. 1674; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, §
101(7), 52 Stat. 481; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 101(7), 53 Stat. 33; I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). See
also Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(a), 80 Stat. 1515 (reference to profes-
sional football leagues added).
' Briefs and Statements on H.R. 3321, supra note 16.
"' Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946)(quoting
Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83, 85 (1929)).
440 U.S. at 478-88.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978).
31 Id.
"440 U.S. at 482.
See material cited note 26 supra.
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garding commercial real estate in Philadelphia)," "real estate boards"
were added to the list of exempt organizations by the Revenue Act of
1928."5 The Philadelphia board received its income in the form of
membership dues and fees for appraisals performed for members only.
The Service sought to tax the board on the theory that the appraisals
performed by the board were of such a nature that if done by third
persons, it would constitute a business enterprise."6 A reading of the
pertinent transcript of the House Ways and Means Committee hear-
ings upon the Revenue Revision of 1927-1928 demonstrates a consen-
sus of opinion among the participating committee members that real
estate boards were never intended by Congress to be treated in a tax
sense any differently from business leagues, chambers of commerce or
boards of trade. 7 Although some felt that the amendment was unnec-
essary because the existing statute was sufficiently broad to include
real estate boards, it was cogently noted that the Service nevertheless
was actively attempting to tax the Philadelphia board and others of its
ilk."
Then in 1966 as part of a large statutory package designed to facili-
tate a merger of professional football leagues, section 501(c)(6) was
further amended to include "professional football leagues (whether or
not administering a pension fund for football players)."" The amend-
ment was enacted to resolve in favor of exempt status the issue of
whether a professional football league's administration of a pension
fund for football players constituted the inurement of net earnings of
the league to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual,
which was prohibited by section 501(c)(6).40
It has been consistently held by the courts that by combining the
elements of the statute and the regulation, the essential requirements
of an organization for exemption under section 501(c)(6) are as follows:
1) It must be an association of persons having a common business
interest.
2) Its purpose must be to promote that common business interest.
3) It must not be organized for profit.
4) Its net earnings, if any, must not inure to the benefit of any pri-
vate shareholder or individual.
5) It should not be engaged in a regular business of a kind ordinarily
conducted for a profit.
Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision
1927-28, Interim, 69th-70th Congs., 235-38 (1927-28).
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 103(7), 45 Stat. 813.
See Hearings on Revenue Revision, supra note 34, at 237.
Id. at 238.
I ld. at 237.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(6), Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(a), 80 Stat. 1515.
40 440 U.S. at 486.
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6) Its activities should be directed toward the improvement of busi-
ness conditions of one or more lines of business as opposed to the perfor-
mance of particular services for individual persons. 1
In order to qualify for the exemption, the organization must satisfy
each of the foregoing requirements,"' and the taxpayer has the burden
of proving that it meets those requirements."3 Furthermore, an entity
seeking the exemption must wrestle with the established rule that an
exemption must be strictly construed, and any doubt must be resolved
in favor of the taxing power. 4'
It is noteworthy that these six requirements do not exist in isolation
one from the others. On the contrary, while it may be desirable from
an analytical approach to discuss them individually, one must remem-
ber that the meaning of each is derived to some extent from the gener-
al context of both the statute and the entire regulation. They must be
taken together. Each requirement bears a significant relationship to
the others, and there is considerable overlap among them. Frequently,
in a single case, the same items of evidence and findings of fact are
used by the court to support or negate more than one requirement."
This author believes that this overlap has contributed to a blurring of
the holdings of many court decisions thus diminishing their preceden-
tial value. Although it defies legal scholarship to discuss one require-
ment without encroaching into the domain of others, nevertheless,
each requirement will be treated separately for ease of analysis.
The requirement that a business league be an association of persons
having some common business purpose has its origin in the regula-
tion.46 The term "persons" includes individuals, unincorporated associ-
ations and corporations.' The term "business" is very comprehensive
and embraces everything about which a person can be employed."8 It
is broad enough to cover any activity conducted for remuneration"
" United States v. Oklahoma City Retailers Ass'n, 331 F.2d 328, 330-31 (10th Cir.
1964); American Woodworking Mach. and Equip. Show, Inc. v. United States, 249 F.
Supp. 392, 396-97 (M.D.N.C. 1966); Associated Master Barbers & Beauticians of Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 53 (1977); American Auto. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 19
T.C. 1146, 1158 (1953).
4269 T.C. at 63.
I d. at 62; Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1935).
"69 T.C. at 62; 7 T.C. at 1464; Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 73 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.
1934).
" See, e.g., Glass Container Indus. Research Corp. v. United States, 70-1 U.S.T.C.
19214 (W.D. Pa. 1970); American Plywood Ass'n v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 830,
833-35 (W.D. Wash. 1967); Indiana Retail Hardware Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 366
F.2d 998, 1001-02 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Men's and Boys' Apparel Club of Fla. v. United States,
168 Ct. CI. 147 (1964); Associated Master Barbers & Beauticians, 69 T.C. at 64-70.
4" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978).
416 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.20 (1973).
"Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1449, 1465 (1946).
*' R. STATHAM & R. BUEK, ASSOCIATIONS AND THE TAX LAWS 11 (1st ed. 1978).
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but does not extend to the realm of hobbies and sports in a noncom-
mercial context.5" The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has denied the exemption to a club, the purpose of which was
more related to sport than to business.51 Mutual business problems of
an association's members have been held to be a sufficient common
business interest.
52
In the determination of the existence of a qualified common busi-
ness interest, the composition of an organization's membership is at
least as important as any statement of interest contained in any of its
articles of incorporation, constitution or bylaws. Often it is only
through an analysis of the membership that it can be determined
what, if any, interests the association's members have in common. The
composition of the membership frequently gives insight into unstated
areas of common interest which may be the real motivating interest
and which also may be an unqualified interest.
In Revenue Ruling 59-391,"s the Service denied exempt status to a
nonprofit association which was organized, among other reasons, for
the mutual exchange of business information among its members and
to encourage all types of trade expansion for the benefit of its mem-
bers. The bylaws of the association provided that no two members
could represent the same trade, business, occupation or profession, and
that no member was permitted to be in competition with another. The
Service concluded that the members had no common business interest
other than the unqualified interest of increasing their individual sales.54
In Associated Industries of Cleveland v. Commissioner,"5 an unin-
corporated association of persons, firms and corporations whose mem-
bership hailed from all types of industry in Cleveland, restricted its
regular membership to employers of five or more persons.5" Despite
express language appearing in the association's constitution, the United
Sates Tax Court found that the real business interest which the organi-
zation's members had in common was the desire to promote "industri-
al peace and sound industrial relations in the community" by advanc-
ing the "open shop" principle and by opposing the spread of "closed
shops."57 Essentially, the common business interest was the desire for a
readily available labor market from which the members could obtain
skilled labor upon terms favorable to the membership.5 Though spe-
' American Kennel Club, Inc. v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1945).
51 Id.
" Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. at 1466-68; Rev. Rul. 76-
400, 1976-2 C.B. 153; Rev. Rul. 74-147, 1974-1 C.B. 136; Rev. Rul. 65-164, 1965-1 C.B.
238.
" Rev. Rul. 59-391, 1959-2 C.B. 151.
5 Id.
7 T.C. 1449 (1946).
Id. at 1451.
id. at 1465.
58 id.
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cifically abstaining from passing upon the social merits of the interest
itself, the court held that the common business interest requirement
had clearly been met. 9
However, the Service has denied exempt status to an association
whose membership was restricted to the business tenants and corporate
owner of a particular shopping center where membership was re-
quired under the terms of the tenants' leases. The Service concluded
that the common business interest of the association was not the gener-
al economic welfare of the community, and that the organization
lacked the essential element of public representation."
Besides having a common business interest, the regulation further
requires that the purpose of the business league must be to promote
that common business interest.2 The idea is to preclude exemption for
organizations whose members may share a common business interest
but whose purpose in forming the association is to promote an unrelat-
ed and unqualified interest. An extreme hypothetical example would
be an association consisting of local attorneys who happen to be sailing
enthusiasts. Clearly, there would be no shortage of qualified common
business interests, such as proposing new legislation, revising rules of
procedure, promoting more efficient use of judicial time, etc. Howev-
er, the real purpose of the organization may be to promote a mutual
hobby. As mentioned above, a bobby is not a business interest. 2 In the
absence of the requirement that the purpose be to promote a common
business interest, the association would qualify as a business league if it
could somehow meet the other requisites.
In Revenue Ruling 65-164, 3 the Service granted business league ex-
emption to a nonprofit corporation whose membership consisted of in-
dividuals, partnerships, firms and corporations engaged in a particular
industry. The common business interest of the members was the pre-
vention and reconciliation of labor disputes. The purposes of the orga-
nization were to conduct collective bargaining with employees and la-
bor groups on behalf of its members, to promote the fulfillment of
such bargaining agreements, to promote the settlement of labor dis-
putes and to promote the prevention of strikes. The Service held that
the organization served the common business interest of its members
both in purpose and in operation, thus it was entitled to exemption
under section 501(c)(6).6 4
The authority for the requirement that the business league must not
be organized for profit comes from the statute itself. 65 The fact that an
51 Id. at 1465-66.
0 Rev. Rul. 73-411, 1973-2 C.B. 180.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978).
6 See American Kennel Club, Inc. v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1945).
63 Rev. Rul. 65-164, 1965-1 C.B. 238.
Id.
sI.R.C. § 501(c)(6).
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organization's constitution, articles of incorporation or articles of asso-
ciation state that it is organized for profit is fatal, and the organization
will not be entitled to the exemption." However, the mere fact that
such document indicates that the organization was not organized for
profit will not conclusively determine for purposes of the exemption
that it was not organized for profit.6 7 Despite language to the contrary
in enabling documents, if an association is formed and operated with a
profit motive or is actually operated for profit, it generally will be
denied the exemption." Moreover, an organization which issues stock
carrying the right to dividends is deemed to be organized for profit."
An activity conducted by the organization may disqualify it for ex-
emption even though it is not done for profit, if it is done for the
convenience and economy of the members.7"
Section 501(c)(6) is also the source of the requirement that no part
of the net earnings of the organization may inure to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual." Even if only a portion of the earn-
ings are paid over to shareholders or individuals, the exemption will be
denied. 2 It is well established that net earnings may inure to the bene-
fit of such persons in a variety of ways other than payment of divi-
dends or other distributions of money." It has been held that profits
inure to the benefit of members where the association can and does
perform services for them more cheaply than for nonmembers because
of profits generated from nonmembers. 4
Indirect benefits received by members as the result of the accom-
plishment of an acceptable purpose which benefits an entire group or
industry as well as the individual member is not prohibited.75 Among
the activities which have been held to be of sufficiently indirect bene-
fit to individuals are the establishment of codes of fair trade practices,
the promotion of legislation beneficial to an entire industry and the
advertisement of the benefits of a whole class of goods.7 On the other
hand, services which directly benefit an individual, such as paying liti-
gation or debt collection expenses or the furnishing of credit lists or
conducting cost surveys for individuals will defeat the exemption."'
R. STATHAM & R. BUEK, supra note 49, at 7.
I Id. at 8.
6' 6 J. MERTENS, supra note 47, at § 34.21.
69 Id.
70 Builders' Exchange of Tex., Inc. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 31,498 at 846
(1972).
I1 .R.c. § 501(c)(6).
72 6 J. MERTENS, supra note 47, at § 34.21.
7 Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. at 1468.
j. MERTENS, supra note 47, at § 34.21.
7s 61 KAN. L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1967).
76 Id.
77 Id.
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In Associated Industries the Tax Court acknowledged that in gen-
eral each member of the organization profited from the association's
success in accomplishing its main purpose of promoting "open shops,"
and each benefited directly on an individual basis from the receipt of
wage data and counseling when strikes occurred. Nevertheless, the as-
sociation was held to be an exempt business league because the princi-
pal purpose of the entity was to serve the entire group of members by
furnishing support to the particular member who needed it, rather
than to provide individual members with services which could be ob-
tained elsewhere. In the eyes of the membership, the concerted action
of all of the members in coming to the aid of the individual member
was a means by which the organization's principal purpose of promot-
ing sound industrial relations could be accomplished.78
Where income generated by the organization is merely incidental
to its principal nonprofit purpose and activity, the organization's fail-
ure to adopt a plan for the distribution of its assets in the event of
dissolution does not necessarily establish that its net earnings will inure
to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals.79 The possibility
that some of the association's assets will be distributed to members
upon dissolution is not in and of itself enough to defeat the exemp-
tion."0
The requirement that the organization not be engaged in a regular
business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit was imposed by the
Commissioner in a regulation."' The central issue in this area is wheth-
er the operation of a regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted
for profit is incidental or subordinate to the main purpose of the orga-
nization, assuming, of course, that its main purpose is one which meets
the other prerequisites for exemption as a business league. If so, then
the exemption will not be denied on this ground.8 2
In Associated Industries the court found that some of the organiza-
tion's activities, such as its employment service, were operated for
profit. But because the genuine, principal purpose for the association
was to establish industrial peace and sound industrial relations in the
community, the court concluded that such activities were incidental to
its main purpose and allowed the exemption. 3
787 T.C. at 1468.
79 Id.
go Id.; Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83, 87 (8th Cir. 1929).
"1 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978).
82 Associated Indus. of Cleveland v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. at 1467. See Crooks v. Kan-
sas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1929); American Institute of Interior
Designers v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1962); Milwaukee Ass'n of Com-
merce v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Wis. 1947). Compare Rev. Rul. 61-170,
1961-2 C.B. 112 with Rev. Rul. 66-338, 1966-2 C.B. 226.
" 7 T.C. at 1467.
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The Service has ruled that a nurse's organization, which operated
an employment registry primarily for its members, was a regular busi-
ness of a kind ordinarily conducted for profit, despite the fact that the
registry was operated on a cooperative basis and produced only
enough income to be self sustaining.14 It has also been held that the
business enterprises pursued for profit do not have to cover the entire
scope of the association's operations nor even a major part of it in or-
der to destroy the exemption. 5
The United States District Court for the Western District of Wash-
ington decided in American Plywood Association v. United States"6
that the plaintiff association's quality control and promotional activi-
ties did not deprive it of exempt status.8 7 These activities were just two
of many inter-related activities of the association. The plaintiff was a
trade association of soft wood plywood manufactures whose members
were responsible for 92.7 percent of the total volume of plywood pro-
duction in the United States during the taxable year in controversy.
During its thirty years of existence, the association's fundamental pur-
pose had been to promote the plywood industry and to inform the
public of the merits of plywood.8 The court relied upon the premise
that the absence of profit motivation was an important factor in deter-
mining whether or not regular business activities were incidental to the
main purpose. Finding that the association had no profits resulting
from its quality control activities, that profits were not the motivation
for such activities, and that the plaintiff's income was derived exclu-
sively from membership dues, the court concluded that the subject ac-
tivity was only incidental to its basic purpose of promoting govern-
ment approval and public acceptance of plywood as a building materi-
al. The fact that the plaintiff continued to perform such services after
plywood testing became available from commercial laboratories was
not considered to be controlling.8
The final requirement has precipitated the most litigation. The reg-
ulation requires that the activities of a business league should be di-
rected to the improvement of business conditions of one or more lines
of business as opposed to the performance of particular services for
individuals." As will become evident, there is a considerable amount
of overlap among the instant requirements-the restriction upon en-
gaging in a regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for profit
s Rev. Rul. 61-170. 1961-2 C.B. 112.
s K. Liles, When Will Business Activities Cause Trade Associations to Forfeit Their
Exempt Status, 49 J. TAX. 104, 105 (1978).
s 267 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Wash. 1967).
I ld. at 835-36.
RId. at 831.
89 Id.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978).
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and the prohibition against net earnings inuring to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual. Further, the requirement at hand
has resulted in two related lines of cases. One is directed to the issue of
whether the association improves the business conditions of one or
more lines of business. The 1979 Supreme Court decision in National
Muffler is the latest word in that line of inquiry. The other body of
case law focuses on whether the organization's activities constitute the
performance of particular services for individual persons. The Master
Barbers case is one of the more important opinions of recent vintage in
that line of cases. Both the National Muffler and Master Barbers cases
reflect a trend on the part of the judiciary toward limiting the business
league exemption.
Turning first to the "particular services" issue, one observes that
several courts are of the opinion that this issue must be bifurcated into
two further inquiries: First, whether a particular nonqualifying activ-
ity is incidental to the principal purpose of the organization and sec-
ond, if so, whether it is a substantial activity in relation to all of the
activities of the organization. 1 Although the cases do not expressly re-
fer to them as such, the first issue is a "qualitative" test, and the sec-
ond is a "quantitative" test.
One of the leading and more analytical cases in the area of "par-
ticular services" is Evanston-North Shore Board of Realtors v. United
States2 in which the United States Court of Claims held that a local
real estate board was not entitled to the exemption under section 501
(c)(6) by virtue of its operation of a multiple listing service. The sub-
ject organization was a nonprofit corporation comprised of licensed
real estate brokers and salesmen whose avowed purposes, as stated in
the articles of incorporation were to maintain the responsibility of its
members in their duty to the public, to enforce fair dealing, to foster
fellowship among its members, and to support such governmental reg-
ulation as was designed to advance the interests of real property own-
ers. For years the board only engaged in activities which were admit-
tedly of a nature which supported the exemption. However, in 1953,
the board added a multiple listing service to its activities, and in 1959,
the Service terminated its exemption because of it. 93
Focusing first upon the qualitative issue whether the activity was
incidental to the principal purpose of the board, the Evanston court
held that the operation of a multiple listing service was not a business
which is normally carried on for profit. As the court noted, the issue of
whether an activity is incidental, rather than primary, to an associ-
9i Indiana Retail Hardware Ass'n v. United States, 366 F.2d at 1001-2; Evanston
-North Shore Bd. of Realtors v. United States, 320 F.2d at 378-82.
9" 320 F.2d 375 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
93 Id.
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ation's principal purpose hinges in most instances upon the further in-
quiry whether the activity is operated primarily for individuals as a
convenience and an economy in the conduct of their respective busi-
nesses, as opposed to providing benefits which are inherently group
benefits. In determining whether the multiple listing service was oper-
ated primarily for the benefit of individual Realtors or that of the real
estate business in general, the court was troubled by its finding that
the interests of the public, the real estate business generally and indi-
vidual Realtors all benefited from the service.94
In order to resolve this dilemma the court analyzed the board's
multiple listing service. The court ultimately gave the greatest weight
in its decision-making process to its finding that the fees charged by
the board to participating individual Realtors were in approximate
proportion to the benefits received by the particular Realtor. Accord-
ing to the design of the multiple listing service in Evanston, an indi-
vidual Real estate broker would pay a fee to the board for each piece
of property which he listed with the service. Any other participating
broker was then free to sell the property, and thus earn a sales com-
mission which was shared by the listing and selling brokers. The selling
broker also paid a fee to the board upon the occurrence of the sale.
The court reasoned that when each member contributes in proportion
to what he receives, it is a strong indication that the benefits received
by him are not inherently group benefits.9 5 Thus it was held that the
board's multiple listing service operated most immediately to the bene-
fit of the individual participating Realtors, rather than for the im-
provement of business conditions within the real estate business gener-
ally. Therefore, the activity was found to be incidental, in a collateral
sense, to the principal purpose of the board.9"
It is appropriate to discuss other relevant cases which have dealt
with this first issue and the reasoning employed in those cases to de-
cide it. In American Woodworking Machinery and Equipment Show,
Inc. v. United States,7 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina upheld the exempt business league status of
a nonprofit corporation whose stated purpose, as contained in its certi-
ficate of incorporation, was to promote, organize, advertise, conduct
and operate woodworking machinery and equipment shows. The cor-
poration's only activity was the carrying on of trade shows for manu-
facturers and sellers of woodworking machinery and equipment.9 Of
the more than 120 companies exhibiting their machinery at the 1963
show, approximately 41 were members of a nonprofit organization
'4 Id. at 377-78.
Is d. at 378-79.
s Id. at 380.
9 249 F. Supp. 392 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
"Id. at 393.
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(exempt under 501(c)(6)), which controlled the plaintiff corporation,
but yet had no members of its own. Those 41 companies received a 33
1/3 percent discount from the plaintiff on the costs of their exhibit
booths. The court's articulation of the central issue bears repeating:
[T]he crucial question for determination is the main primary purpose for
which the 1963 trade show was organized and conducted. If it was to
promote the welfare and improve the business conditions of the entire
woodworking machinery industry, and any services or profit inuring to
the benefit of exhibitors were merely incidental to the main purpose, it
necessarily follows that the plaintiff is a business league within the
meaning of the statute and is entitled to its claimed exemption. Con-
versely, if the trade show activities rendered only insignificant benefit to
the industry as a whole, and were primarily designed to render valuable
services to individual exhibitors by affording them an economical means
to sell their machinery, the exemption should be denied.99
Relying upon Texas Mobile Home Association v. Commissioner"'. and
American Institute of Interior Designers v. United States,"' the court
resolved this issue in favor of the plaintiff corporation." 2
By way of contrast, the United States Court of Claims in Indiana
Retail Hardware Association, Inc. v. United States"'O held that the in-
come producing activities of the nonprofit corporation composed of
hardware retailers were sufficient to deprive the association of exempt
status."' The organization engaged in both income and non-income
producing activities. The income generating activities were many and
diverse and included the sale to members of display fixtures and ad-
vertising promotional aids; providing individual members the manage-
rial services, weekly bookkeeping, quarterly audits and yearly prepara-
tion of federal income tax returns; premium collection and claim form
distribution for underwriters who provided group health, accident and
life insurance to members; rentals of exhibit space to hardware whole-
salers and manufacturers at its annual hardware show; and advertise-
ments in its program published in conjunction with the annual show."'
In Retail Hardware, the court cited the "proportional benefits" ra-
tionale in Evanston in support of its holding that providing managerial
services, bookkeeping, quarterly audits and preparing federal income
tax returns for individual members who paid a fee in return was not
beneficial to the membership as a whole. Thus, the first issue was de-
cided against the association."'
11 Id. at 397.
'w324 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1963).
... 208 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
10 249 F. Supp. at 398.
103 366 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
I' ld. at 1002.
... Id. at 1000.
"'Id. at 1001.
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Similarly, in Contracting Plumbers Cooperative Restoration Cor-
poration v. United States,"0 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit also applied the "proportional benefits" concept. In
that case, a nonprofit corporation comprised of most of the licensed
plumbers in New York City was organized for the sole purpose of effi-
ciently repairing holes in the streets made by its members in the
course of their plumbing activities. Prior to the formation of the corpo-
ration, city employees repaired the streets and billed the responsible
plumber. But the old system was undesirable because it was highly
inefficient from a financial standpoint, and because it subjected the
community to dangers, while simultaneously exposing the plumbers to
potential liability for personal injury for unduly long periods of time.
Under the new system, the association conducted the repairs on the
basis of a private nonprofit cooperative in which individual plumbers
continued to pay for street repairs which their individual plumbing
work necessitated. The new system was very successful and generally
regarded as a boon to all concerned.' 0
In denying exempt status under section 501(c)(6), the court rea-
soned that although all plumbers of the city might have received some
small, incidental benefit from the community's goodwill toward
plumbers generally, which resulted from the association's activities, the
individual members received far more in an economic sense. Each
member received economic benefits precisely to the extent that he
used the restoration service of the association.0 9 The court further held
that where "individual benefits [were] precisely proportional to the
member's financial involvement in the organization, the fundamental-
ly nonexempt purpose of providing a necessary service at reduced
cost" was the purpose being served."'
In 1970, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania in Glass Container Industry Research Corporation v.
United States,"' denied exempt status to a nonprofit corporation
whose membership consisted only of sellers and manufacturers of glass
containers. The purpose of the corporation was to conduct scientific
research in the field of glass container production and manufacture.
Although research projects were directed to problems confronting the
entire glass container industry, members were forbidden to share pro-
ject reports with nonmembers, and patent rights resulting from such
projects were available to members free of royalty payments."'
The court conceded that the corporation did not provide particular
107 488 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1974).
'" Id. at 685-86.
'O Id. at 688.
110 Id.
70-1 U.S.T.C. 9214 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
Id. at 82,854.
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services to individual members,"3 a fact that would eliminate reliance
upon the "proportional benefits" theory. Undaunted, the court further
found that the organization was a cooperative research facility through
which members could pool their funds in such a manner that the
membership could secure the benefit of costly research through the
expenditure of relatively modest sums of money. Essentially, the orga-
nization was a cooperative effort on the part of a limited number of
persons to research projects for the benefit of themselves, rather than
for the public or the entire industry." 4 The court rejected the notion
that the phrase "performance of particular services for individual
members" referred only to single individual members. That phrase
was held to be applicable to the organization in question, consisting of
30 percent of the manufacturers in the same industry, who banded
together for the sole purpose of developing cheaper and better meth-
ods of increasing their individual profits through the restricted use of
their research. Thus, it was held that the corporation was not entitled
to the exemption under section 501(c)(6). 115
If the initial qualitative inquiry in the "particular services" issue is
decided against the organization, all is not lost. The second consider-
ation inherent in that issue is the quantitative question-whether or
not an otherwise nonexempt activity is the primary activity of the or-
ganization. If the particular dubious activity under consideration is a
minor one in relation to other acceptable activities, the organization
will not be denied exempt status on the ground that it performs par-
ticular services for individual persons.""
It is appropriate at this point in the discussion to return to the
Evanston decision. After determining that the board's multiple listing
service was operated primarily for the individual members as a conve-
nience and economy in the conduct of their respective businesses, the
Court of Claims addressed this second issue. The court articulated the
issue in the following terms: "An organization whose principal purpose
and activity is such as to justify exemption does not lose its exempt
status by engaging in incidental activity which standing alone would
be subject to taxation." ' Refusing to concentrate upon the stated pur-
pose of the board in determining the significance of the multiple list-
ing service, the court held that the board's purpose cannot be disassoci-
ated from its activities.118 Although the court was careful to state that
the financial data referred to in that case was not the only relevant
criteria capable of being used in determining the relative importance
I Id. at 82,857.
114 Id.
1
5 Id.
"6320 F.2d at 380.
"7 Id.
"I Id. at 381.
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of one of an organization's many activities," 9 the court focused atten-
tion upon the fact that 61 percent of the board's gross income for fiscal
year 1956 was derived from operation of the multiple listing service,
and the finding that the increase from one to five in the number of
employees of the board was necessitated by the service.' The court
concluded that the service had become the dominant, rather than an
incidental, activity of the board. Therefore, it was no longer entitled to
an exemption. 2'
Using similar reasoning, The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Oklahoma City Retailers Associ-
ation," 2 held that an association's credit information service conducted
for its members constituted a substantial part of its activities, and
therefore, was not entitled to an exemption."' The income generated
from its credit information service accounted for most of its gross in-
come, which in 1956 amounted to $193,947.94. Furthermore, of the 65
employees of the association, all but two of them spent all of their time
on the credit information service, and the other two devoted 90 per-
cent of their time to that pursuit."12
In Retail Hardware, after determining that the income producing
activities of the association were of direct economic benefit to individ-
uals, rather than for the improvement of business conditions for the
entire industry generally, the Court of Claims reached the second issue
expressed in Evanston. Based upon its findings that for the year 1954
the income derived from the subject activities amounted to 58.54 per-
cent of the association's total income, and that approximately 50 per-
cent of the time of association employees was devoted to such activi-
ties, rather than to activities for the improvement of conditions in the
retail hardware business as a whole, the court held that the income
producing activities of the association were sufficiently substantial to
deprive it of exempt status."'
It is fitting that Master Barbers is the final case for discussion in the
area of the "particular services" issue. By the time this opinion was
handed down in 1977, all of the cases previously discussed had been
decided. Although this author believes that the result in Master Bar-
bers is fundamentally correct, the opinion of the Tax Court in that
case illustrates the widespread confusion in the analytical distinctions,
or lack of same, made by the courts among the various requirements
of a business league. The case is also important because it demonstrates
Id. at 382.
"' Id. at 380.
Id. at 382.
'z 331 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1964).
"' Id. at 331.
Id. at 329.
3 66 F.2d at 1002.
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a judicial unwillingness to expand the business league exemption be-
yond traditional limits. It should be mentioned that the case involved
two principal issues: First, whether the corporation qualified for ex-
emption under section 501(c)(6) as a business league and second,
whether the corporation was a "membership organization" subject to
section 277 of the Internal Revenue Code. 126 The latter issue is beyond
the scope of this article and will not be discussed further.
The subject organization was a nonprofit corporation whose purpose
according to its constitution was, among other things, to elevate the
professional standards of barbers and beauticians, to broaden and pro-
fessionalize their services and to promote and develop improved bar-
ber and beauty science techniques.127 The activities of the corporation
were many and included the sale of textbooks for barbers, styling
books and association jewelry, conducting styling courses and involve-
ment in a monthly publication of interest both to members and the
profession as a whole. In addition, during the taxable years in question,
the corporation operated for its members self-insured basic sick and
death benefit plans and a voluntary supplemental benefit plan. Fur-
thermore, the corporation performed administrative services and
minor bookkeeping for underwriters who offered to members a new
basic sick and death benefit plan, a major benefit plan, hospital insur-
ance and comprehensive hospitalization insurance plans. Moreover, be-
tween 1964 and 1975, malpractice and personal liability insurance was
offered to members by commercial underwriters through the organiza-
tion. 12
As regards to the requirements for the business league exemption,
the court had no difficulty in finding that the corporation was an asso-
ciation of persons having a common business interest, that its purpose
was to promote that common business interest and that it was not or-
ganized for profit.1 29 But the court concluded that the organization
failed to meet the remaining requirements. The thrust of the court's
argument was directed toward the corporation's engagement in a reg-
ular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit and the perfor-
mance of particular services for individual persons.
The court considered the issue of whether the organization had en-
gaged in a regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for profit.
Initially, the court reviewed the many insurance related activities of
the corporation, the fact that an overwhelming majority of the mem-
bers participated in the self-insurance plans offered by the organiza-
tion, and the finding that the number of claims processed by the asso-
ciation was substantial. The court rejected the organization's argument
116 69 T.C. at 54.
1 1d. at 63.
12 id. at 56-57.
'29 Id. at 64.
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that the income from its insurance programs was related to its exempt
purpose in that the provision of proper protection for its members,
who would otherwise not be able to obtain such protection, promoted
the good of the profession as a whole. 30
In support of its argument, the corporation relied upon the case of
Oklahoma Cattlemen's Association, Inc. v. United States. 3' In that
case, a similar argument was used to establish that the organization's
insurance program offered to its members was substantially related to
the exempt purpose of promoting educational and scientific programs
affecting the cattle industry of Oklahoma, to prevent cattle theft and
control cattle diseases, to improve cattle breeding and to serve the mu-
tual interests and common aims of the cattlemen of Oklahoma.132 The
Master Barbers court distinguished Cattlemen's Association on the
grounds that it involved an agricultural organization whose source of
exemption was section 501(c)(5), not section 501(c)(6); that the rel-
evant issue was the applicability of the unrelated business income tax
under section 511, not whether the exemption should be revoked; and
that the association in that case was only passively involved in the in-
surance program offered in its name through a commercial underwrit-
er, rather than the active operation of a self-insured insurance pro-
gram. 133
The court also distinguished San Antonio District Dental Society v.
United States' involving a business league, with no insurance pro-
grams. The pertinent issue there was the taxability of unrelated busi-
ness income under section 511 and not the revocation of exempt sta-
tus. 135 The court in Master Barbers concluded that the corporation was
engaged in a regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for profit,
to wit, the insurance business.'36 It is noteworthy to mention that the
court focused on the corporation's self-insurance programs,'37 rather
than upon the other insurance programs which involved commercial
underwriters and in which the organization was more passively in-
volved.
Whether through inadvertance or design, at this point in its analy-
sis, the Master Barbers court took an interesting twist. Although the
prior cases do not speak in terms of a "qualitative" test and a "quanti-
tative" test, much less attempt to specifically delineate the require-
ments to which those tests are applicable, it is this author's impression
I" Id. at 64-65.
3 10 F. Supp. 320 (W.D. Okla. 1969).
1I Id. at 323.
'' 69 T.C. at 66-67.
340 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
"' 69 T.C. at 67.
""Id. at 66.
i Id. at 64-65.
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that the "quantitative" test has previously been used exclusively in the
realm of the requirement that a business league should not perform
particular services for individual persons. Moreover, while cases such
as Associated Industries and American Plywood speak of activities as
being either incidental or primary to an organization's main purpose
in determining the issue of whether or not that activity is a regular
business of a type ordinarily conducted for profit, they do not refer to
a quantitative test in regard to that issue.
It is not remarkable that the Master Barbers court should examine
the association's income producing activities to determine whether
they are incidental to the main purpose of the organization, and thus
in the nature of a regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for
profit. However, what is noteworthy is that considering the "regular
business" requirement the court felt compelled to examine the extent
of those suspect activities, in order to establish whether they are sub-
stantial in relation to all of the organization's activities.' Thus, the
court has incorporated into the "regular business" requirement the
quantitative test formerly used only in the determination of the "par-
ticular services" requirement. The court offered no explanation for this
innovation.
What is even more curious is the court's reliance upon Evanston as
authority for that further examination." 9 As previously noted, the
Court of Claims in Evanston expressly held that the multiple listing
service in question was not a regular business of a kind ordinarily con-
ducted for profit, and its inquiry as to the extent of that activity in
relation to all activities of the board was made in conjunction with the
"particular services" issue.
In deciding whether the insurance activities of the corporation were
substantial, the court considered both the time which the employees of
the organization devoted to its various functions as well as the organi-
zation's financial data, such as its receipts and disbursements for the
taxable years in question. Finding that the association's employees per-
formed numerous clerical duties and kept voluminous records in re-
gard to the insurance programs, the court concluded that a substantial
amount of time was devoted to the insurance activities.' Further-
more, the court found that receipts and disbursements from the self-
insurance programs in fiscal year 1967 were 43 percent and 35 percent
respectively of total receipts and total disbursements during that year;
31 percent and 30 percent in fiscal year 1970; 31 percent and 32 per-
cent in fiscal year 1971; and 11 percent and 21 percent in 1973."' On
138 69 T.C. at 67-69.
I ld. at 67.
"' Id. at 69.
'Id. at 68.
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the basis of the foregoing findings, the court concluded that the insur-
ance activities were substantial.
1 42
After concluding that the organization was engaged in a regular
business of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit, the court turned to
the requirement that the activity should not be directed to the perfor-
mance of particular services for individual persons. After reviewing all
of the corporation's activities, it was determined that there was sub-
stantial evidence of activities in the nature of particular services for
individual persons, but relatively few activities designed to improve
business conditions in the barbering and beautician professions.1" The
court held that the corporation was performing particular services for
individuals because of its conclusion that, if the organization had not
provided the goods and services in question, the individual members
would have had to obtain them from nonexempt businesses at a higher
price. Thus, the court revoked the corporation's exempt status."' The
court did not engage in a discussion of the extent of the insurance
activities vis a' vis all of the organization's activities for purposes of
this requirement. Presumably, the court considered the quantitative
test was as applicable here as in the "regular business" issue and would
do double duty without further mention.
By applying the quantitative test to the "regular business" require-
ment, it is arguable that the court in Master Barbers has paved the
way for organizations to provide such insurance programs to its mem-
bers, provided that those insurance activities do not rise to the level of
being substantial in relation to all of the organization's activities. Ab-
sent the applicability of a quantitative test to the "regular business"
requirement, the mere determination that a particular activity was a
regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for profit would de-
stroy the business league exemption. While the bottom line on substan-
tiality has never been clearly expressed, the criteria for determining
substantiality mentioned in cases such as Evanston and Retail Hard-
ware, would seem to be equally applicable in the area of the "regular
business" requirement as they are in the "particular services" context.
In one respect it is unfortunate that the insurance activities in
Master Barbers occupied so much of the organization's time, account-
ed for such large percentages of its receipts and disbursements, and
were in the form of self-insurance. In the face of such factual findings,
which viewed in combination were so blatantly indicative of nonex-
emption, it was hardly surprising that the court's decision followed the
general trend, engendered in Evanston and Retail Hardware, to limit
the exemption. The precedential value of the case would have been
142 Id. at 69.
i Id. at 70.
14 Id.
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enhanced if the organization's insurance program had been similar to
that in Cattlemen's Association, where there was no self-insurance
program and the organization was only passively involved in the pro-
gram. Nevertheless, it is significant that the court rejected the petition-
er's argument, obviously borrowed from the holding in Cattlemen's
Association, that the income from its insurance programs was related
to its exempt function. The court did not accept the assertion that the
organization promoted the good of a profession as a whole when it
provided insurance protection and other fringe benefits to the mem-
bers of a profession, who but for the organization, would not have
those benefits.1
45
Although the Master Barber opinion does not expressly say so, it
does strongly imply that the operation of insurance programs for the
benefit of members (especially as regards organizations whose purposes
are similar to those in Master Barbers) will be deemed to be the oper-
ation of regular businesses of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit. In
that regard, the court failed to discuss two relevant revenue rulings in
which the Service has upheld section 501(c)(6) exemptions for organi-
zations which have engaged in insurance programs.
In Revenue Ruling 71-155,' the Service permitted the exemption
for a nonprofit association composed of insurance companies in a par-
ticular state, whose purpose was to equitably distribute high-risk poli-
cies among all members of the association. Membership in the associ-
ation was required by the state insurance commission of all insurance
companies writing a specified type of insurance in that state. The Ser-
vice ruled that the organization's activities promoted "the common
business interests of the members since the spreading of high-risk poli-
cies among its members provided insurance to persons who would nor-
mally be unable to obtain insurance and minimizes public criticism of
the industry."1 '7 A similar result was reached in Revenue Ruling 76-
4104 which involved a nonprofit association of insurance companies
doing business in a particular state, whose purpose was to provide per-
sonal injury protection for certain residents who, if injured, would not
otherwise be covered by insurance." 9
Thus, it would seem that the operation of insurance programs per se
is not damning in and of itself. Keeping in mind the vast extent of the
insurance activities involved in Master Barbers on the one hand, and
the more liberal holdings in Cattlemen's Association, and Revenue
Rulings 71-155 and 76-410 on the other, there appears to be a contin-
uum in which Master Barbers occupies one extreme and those other
"4 Id. at 64.
... Rev. Rul. 71-155, 1971-1 C.B. 152.
147 td.
Ma Rev. Rul. 76-410, 1976-2 C.B. 155.
1,9Id.
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As previously mentioned, neither the 1913 Act nor any of its statu-
tory successors has ever defined the term "business league." However,
a definition has been supplied by the Commissioner in the form of a
Treasury regulation. In the first relevant regulation, which was pro-
mulgated in 1919, it was expressly stated that the work of a business
league "need not be similar to that of a chamber of commerce or
board of trade."' 50 But when confronted in 1924 with the application
of a stock exchange for an exemption as a business league, the Service
recognized that the then current definition of a business league was
too broad, and could conceivably include organizations of a type
which the Service believed Congress never intended to be exempt."'
In denying the application, the Service for the first time in this context
invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,12 which loosely translated
from the Latin means "a word is known by the company it keeps.""' 3
It was held that the congressional use of the words "business league,"
"chamber of commerce" and "board of trade" in the same subpara-
graph of the statute was intended to limit the exemption to organiza-
tions having the same general characteristics as those organizations,
such as having as a primary purpose the promotion of general business
welfare. The Service held that a stock exchange did not qualify since
its primary purpose was to benefit private interests. In the wake of
that decision, the regulation was amended in 1925 to exclude stock
exchanges." 4 That is a regulatory restriction which has survived to the
present day."' Following the 1928 amendment to the pertinent statute,
adding "real estate boards" to the list of exempt organizations, the reg-
ulation in 1929 was again amended. The statement that a business
league's work need not be similar to that of a chamber of commerce or
board of trade was deleted. It was replaced with the following lan-
guage which has since endured without material change:
It is an organization of the same general class as a chamber of com-
merce or board of trade. Thus its activity should be directed to the im-
provement of business conditions or to the promotion of the general ob-
jects of one or more lines of business as distinguished from the perfor-
mance of particular services for individual persons."'
In 1946, the Tax Court in Associated Industries was called upon to
interpret the requirement in question. As previously noted, the court
determined that the real purpose of the association was to establish
Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 518 (1919).
440 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 485 n.20.
"1 Id. at 481.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1978).
" 440 U.S. at 482.
[Vol. 2:1
BUSINESS LEAGUE EXEMPTION
industrial peace and sound industrial relations in the community by
advocating the "open shop" principle.157 Although the court was ap-
parently unconvinced of the efficacy and social merit of the associ-
ation's activities, it did not regard it within the court's province to
judge "the social, political, or economic wisdom or morality of peti-
tioner's activities." '158 Instead the court used a reasonable business man
standard to determine whether the activities were directed toward im-
proving business conditions in one or more lines of business. The court
upheld the exemption stating:
If petitioner's members were of the opinion that its activities were di-
rected to the improvement of labor conditions in their lines of business,
if this opinion was one which could be held by reasonably prudent busi-
ness men under the same circumstances of time and place, and if the
activities themselves were legal when carried on, we must conclude that
this requirement of the regulations has been met.
We know of no requirement that the purpose of a business league, as
that term is used in the statute, must be the betterment of a geographi-
cal community rather than the advancement of the selfish interests of a
community of businesses having a common objective.'59
In Revenue Ruling 58-294,' the Service denied section 501(c)(6)
exempt status to an association whose membership was limited to any
person, firm or corporation licensed to manufacture and sell a speci-
fied patented product. The exemption was denied because, among oth-
er reasons, the association was furthering the business interests of the
dealers in the particular patented product, rather than improving the
business conditions of one or more lines of business.16 ' A similar result
was reached in Revenue Ruling 59-39162 discussed earlier. In that rul-
ing, the organization required that its members give preference to one
another in business transactions for their mutual and exclusive benefit.
The Service concluded that the organization's activities were directed
to the promotion of the private interests of its members, rather than to
the improvement of one or more lines of business. Therefore, it would
not be entitled to exemption as a business league.'63
In 1966, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decided the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' Association, Inc. v.
United States,'1 which involved a nonprofit corporation whose mem-
's' 7 T.C. at 1465.
'Id. at 1466.
15 Id.
" Rev. Rul. 58-294, 1958-1 C.B 244.
161 Id.
12 Rev. Rul. 59-391, 1959-2 C.B. 151.
163 Id.
1" 369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966).
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bership was restricted to Pepsi-Cola bottlers. The purposes of the asso-
ciation were "to promote, extend, further, protect and improve the
trade and business of bottling and selling Pepsi-Cola."1"5 Among its ac-
tivities, the association represented its members in negotiations with
the Pepsi-Cola Company, issued questionnaires and distributed infor-
mation on commonly used procedures and equipment, made reports
on available insurance coverage, conducted management training for
its members, and issued news bulletins. The bulletins, questionnaires
and reports were available to nonmembers also.16
The court found that no activity was conducted for the benefit of
individual bottlers or limited groups of bottlers, and that the organiza-
tion was not engaged in regular businesses. The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the association's activities contributed to the improvement
of the Pepsi-Cola bottling business and therefore, to the consuming
public as well, although the court did not elaborate upon the connec-
tion between the two. The majority opinion held that a business league
need not be devoted to the general public welfare, that the association
cannot be denied an exemption simply because its members all bottle a
particular brand of soft drink, and that having satisfied all the prereq-
uisites, the instant association was entitled to the exemption.6 7
In his dissenting opinion in the Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' case, Judge
Kiley argued that the association failed to satisfy the doctrine of nosci-
tur a sociis since it lacked the general characteristics of a chamber of
commerce, real estate board and board of trade.16 Viewing the bot-
tling of Pepsi-Cola as a component of a line of business (the cola and
soft drink industry), rather than as an independent line of business in
and of itself, Judge Kiley reasoned that the association's activities were
conducted for the direct benefit of its members and not for the benefit
of the community or to improve the conditions of a particular trade, as
is characteristic of chambers of commerce, boards of trade, etc." 9
The significance of the Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' case lies in its distinc-
tion from prior cases which involved "lines of business" which were
comprised of an entire industry or all components of an industry with-
in a particular geographical area. 70 By way of contrast, the "line of
business" at issue in the Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' case was merely a single
' Id. at 251.
"I ld. at 251-52.
' Id. at 252.
Id. (Kiley, J., dissenting).
' 9 Id. at 253.
... See, e.g., Contracting Plumbers Coop. Restoration Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d
684 (2d Cir. 1974); Commissioner v. Chicago Graphic Arts Fed'n, Inc., 128 F.2d 424
(7th Cir. 1942); Crooks v. Kansas City Hay Dealers' Ass'n, 37 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1929);
American Plywood Ass'n v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Wash. 1967); Indiana
Retail Hardware Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 366 F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Washington
State Apples, Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 64 (1942).
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stage in the production of a particular brand of a certain product.'
Implicit in the majority opinion was the holding that the business en-
terprises attendant with a single brand of a particular type of product
or commodity could constitute an independent line of business for pur-
poses of the business league exemption. Unfortunately, the court of-
fered no explanation for this new position. Nevertheless, by construing
the term "line of business" in this manner, the court relaxed the quali-
fications for the business league exemption. In this same regard, it is
noteworthy to mention that the majority opinion was silent on the top-
ic of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. In Revenue Ruling 68-182,172 the
Service indicated that it would not follow the Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' de-
cision in future cases.
It was with the foregoing background, that the United States Su-
preme Court in 1979 decided the case of National Muffler Dealers
Association, Inc. v. United States.17' The majority affirmed the Second
Circuit's affirmation of the district court's denial of exempt status un-
der section 501(c)(6) on the grounds that Midas muffler franchises did
not constitute a "line of business.""' Justices Stewart, Rehnquist and
Stevens dissented. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
jurisdictional split between the Second and Seventh Circuits on the is-
sue of whether a single brand of a given product may constitute a
"line of business."'' 5
The National Muffler Dealers Association, Inc. was organized as a
nonprofit corporation in 1971 by franchisees of the Midas Internation-
al Corporation, in order to protect their interests in the midst of inter-
nal dissention then brewing in the corporate structure of Midas Inter-
national. 6 Although the association's certificate of incorporation stated
that its purpose was to promote the best interests of muffler dealers
generally, its initial bylaws restricted membership to Midas franchi-
sees. In an apparent effort to secure the desired exemption, the bylaws
were later amended to permit any muffler franchisee whatsoever to be
a member. In any event, no member had ever been anything other
than a Midas franchisee. 77 The principal activity of the association was
to intervene as a bargaining agent on behalf of its members in their
negotiations with Midas International. In its attack, the government
"' 369 F.2d 253.
." Rev. Rul. 68-182, 1968-1 C.B. 263. See also Rev. Rul. 67-77, 1967-1 C.B. 138, in
which the Service denied the business league exemption to an organization whose mem-
bership was restricted to dealers holding franchises for the sale of a particular brand of
automobile in a certain geographical area. Its purpose was to finance general advertising
campaigns in order to increase sales.
"' 440 U.S. 472.
' ld. at 488.
"'436 U.S. 930 (1978).
"'565 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977).
'Id. at 845-46.
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conceded that the association had satisfied all requirements for busi-
ness league exemption, except that it did not improve business condi-
tions in one or more lines of business.
1 78
Invoking the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the common characteristic of section 501(c)(6) organiza-
tions was that they fostered "well-being within a broadly-defined seg-
ment of the commercial sector,- 179 which for a chamber of commerce
was defined geographically, while the commercial sector of a board of
trade was defined in terms of a specified business or industry.80 The
court upheld the reasonableness of the pertinent regulation because its
"'line of business" requirement implemented the congressional inten-
tion of granting the exemption only to those organizations which pro-
mote some aspect of the general economic welfare within a broad seg-
ment of the business community. The Second Circuit further held that
the "line of business" requirement was not met in the present case
because the association's members were directly related to a single pri-
vate firm, its activities were directed exclusively to serving the inter-
ests of Midas franchisees, the bulk of the muffler industry in effect,
was excluded from membership, and no benefit was conferred by the
association on muffler dealers in general. 81
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the "line
of business" requirement in the regulation was a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the pertinent statute.1 82 The majority opinion traced the evolu-
tion of the current regulation since its inception in 1919. The Court
noted the 1929 amendment, by which the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis was incorporated into the regulation in place of the concept that
a business league's work need not be similar to that of a chamber of
commerce or board of trade. The Court further observed that the lan-
guage of the amendment in question has not been materially altered
since 1929, despite several re-enactments and one amendment of the
statute. 83 Citing United States v. Cartwright,8 ' the Supreme Court
held that where a statutory term, such as the term, "business league"
in the instant case, has no well-defined meaning, courts generally de-
fer to the regulation which "if found to implement the congressional
mandate in some reasonable manner must be upheld." ' 5 Authority for
this deference was found in section 7805(a) of the Code which dele-
gates to the Commissioner, as opposed to the courts, the task of pre-
1"' Id. at 846.
179 Id.
180 Id.
" Id. at 847.
12 440 U.S. at 473.
1"3 Id. at 482.
184 11 U.S. 546 (1973).
115 440 U.S. at 476-77 (quoting United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967))
(quoted in United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. at 550).
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scribing "all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the
Code. 186
The essence of the Court's analysis is reflected in the following lan-
guage:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the con-
gressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the reg-
ulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and
its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have
been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a later
period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant
considerations are the length of time the regulation has been in effect,
the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's interpre-
tation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation
during subsequent re-enactments of the statute."' 7
In reaching its decision to affirm the judgment of the Second Cir-
cuit, the majority emphasized the fact that the "line of business" lan-
guage of the regulation has stood for 50 years without material
change; that during those 50 years, the Service and the courts have
interpreted the term "line of business" to mean either an entire indus-
try or all components of an industry within a geographic area; and
that the Commissioner consistently denied the exemption to groups de-
signed to promote a particular product, rather than to improving con-
ditions in an entire industrial line.188 The high court concluded:
In short, while the Commissioner's reading of § 501(c)(6) perhaps is
not the only possible one, it does bear a fair relationship to the language
of the statute, it reflects the views of those who sought its enactment,
and it matches the purpose they articulated. It evolved as the Commis-
sioner administered the statute and attempted to give to a new phrase a
content that would reflect congressional design. The regulation has stood
for 50 years, and the Commissioner infrequently but consistently has
interpreted it to exclude an organization like the Association that is not
industrywide. The Commissioner's view therefore merits serious defer-
ence. 89
The brief dissenting opinion rendered by Justice Stewart favored
reversal. 90 Besides adopting the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in
Pepsi-Cola Bottlers', the dissenting opinion also championed one of
the main arguments urged by the petitioner and rejected by the ma-
jority. It was argued that the subject regulation was unreasonable and
therefore invalid, because it unduly narrowed the statute. In its origi-
s I.R.C. § 7805(a).
II? 440 U.S. at 477.
1I Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.
"9 Id. at 489 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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nal 1919 form, the predecessor of the instant regulation specifically
stated that the work of a business league need not be similar to that of
a chamber of commerce or board of trade. Being more close in time to
the enactment of the statute in 1918 than was the 1929 amendment to
the regulation, it was asserted that the 1919 language, which un-
equivocally rejected the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, should be regard-
ed as the true interpretation of the congressional mandate.1 9' Favoring
the need for flexibility in statutory interpretation by federal agencies
over the weight to be accorded contemporaneity, the Court rejected
that argument.'
The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that the 1966
amendment adding "professional football leagues" to the statute re-
quired a new interpretation of noscitur a sociis.'9 Furthermore, the
Court declined the petitioner's invitation to expand judicially the busi-
ness league exemption to include franchisee associations, which were
unknown at the time of the 1918 Act.1
94
As two of the most recent major decisions on the subject of the busi-
ness league exemption, the Master Barbers and National Muffler cases
are indicative of a movement by the judiciary to restrict the exemption
to traditional boundaries. Preliminarily, it is noted that in both cases
the exemption was denied. But more importantly, in both cases, the
courts declined to seize the opportunity to enlarge the scope of the
exemption either directly, by granting the exemption upon the actual
factual circumstances of the cases at bar or indirectly, through dicta
which could give direction toward expansion in future cases by explor-
ing possible factual situations which, in the court's opinion, would
qualify for the exemption.
Admittedly, the self-insurance programs in the Master Barbers case
were sufficiently substantial in relation to its other activities to warrant
denial of the exemption on the ground that it failed to meet the "par-
ticular services" requirement. However, without disturbing the ulti-
mate result in that particular case, the Master Barbers court in deter-
mining the "regular business" issue could have held, but did not, that
the association's insurance programs were related to its otherwise
exempt purposes, in that the provision of proper insurance protection
for its members, who would otherwise not be able to obtain such pro-
tection, promoted the good of the profession as a whole, as was held in
Cattlemen's Association. Moreover, the Tax Court rejected the chance
to expand the exemption through dicta by holding that associations,
which are only passively engaged in insurance activities for the benefit
of their members, are not engaged in a regular business of a kind con-
191 Id.
.. 440 U.S. at 488.
Id. at 486-87.
Id. at 488.
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ducted for profit, as was done in Cattlemen's Association, which dealt
with the section 501(c)(5) exemption. Clearly, the overall tenor of the
opinion is negative.
The National Muffler case is even more illustrative of judicial re-
luctance to assume the initiative to expand the exemption. Throughout
the entire Supreme Court opinion, most of which was devoted to the
issue of the reasonableness of the regulation, no reference was made to
the reasonable businessman standard, which was formulated by the
Tax Court in Associated Industries to determine whether the activities
of an organization were directed toward improving business conditions
in one or more lines of business. Essentially, that case held that if an
organization's members believe that the activities are directed toward
improving business conditions in their line of business, and if reason-
ably prudent businessmen under the same or similar circumstances
could hold the same opinion, then that issue should be decided in fa-
vor of the organization. As reflected in the Second Circuit's opinion in
National Muffler, the petitioner argued that its activities ultimately
benefit all muffler dealers, because franchisees of other muffler manu-
facturers will follow the lead of the petitioner in seeking and acquiring
from their franchisors the same benefits that petitioner has secured
from Midas International.' Under the circumstances, it would have
been appropriate for the Supreme Court to discuss the reasonableness
of that argument in the context of the reasonable businessman stan-
dard. If it had been so inclined, the Court could have solidly incorpo-
rated that standard into the "line of business" requirement with all the
weight of authority of that august tribunal. But the high court did not
elect to do so.
In effect, the Supreme Court ruled that organizations which are not
industrywide cannot qualify for the business league exemption.19 After
National Muffler, only two things are clear. An organization which
benefits an entire industry or all components of an industry within a
geographic area will satisfy the "line of business" requirement. On the
other hand, an organization which directs its activities toward improv-
ing the business conditions of private business enterprises engaged in
one phase of the production, manufacturing, packaging or marketing,
etc., of a single brand of a particular product will not qualify.'97 How-
ever, the Court did not undertake to define the terms "industry" or
"industrywide." In an economy as complex as that of the United
States, it is not sufficient to treat the "line of business" concept in such
a dichotomous fashion.
Unfortunately, the Court left to speculation and future cases many
unanswered questions. No effort was made to distinguish the treatment
565 F.2d at 847.
'"440 U.S. at 488.
197 Id.
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to be accorded associations involving different types of industries. No
two industries are the same in a macroeconomic sense. Some, like the
telephone industry, are near monopolies, other industries are oligopo-
listic, while still others approach pure competiton. Can it be said that
an association- whose membership is open to "all" firms (i.e., one) in-
volved in a monopolistic industry should be just as qualified for ex-
emption under section 501(c)(6) as a similar organization involving a
purely competitive industry, all other things being equal? Further-
more, the Supreme Court did not discuss meaningfully whether or not
the association in question in the National Muffler case could have
brought itself within the "line of business" requirement by broadening
its membership to include all muffler dealers regardless of brand or by
taking some other remedial action.
The value of the National Muffler decision from a planning view-
point is further diminished by the fact that, despite the undeniably
clear conflict between the Second and Seventh Circuits on the "line of
business" issue, the Supreme Court did not specifically overrule the
Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' case. Although it is obvious that for all intents and
purposes the Pepsi-Cola Bottlers' case has been overruled sub silentio,
considering the vast abyss left by the majority opinion in National
Muffler, it may be possible to distinguish between the two cases and
thus give new life to Pepsi-Cola Bottlers'.
In summation it would appear that if the business league exemption
is going to be broadened in the future, the impetus for that expansion
is not likely to come from the judicial branch. If anything, the judicia-
ry has demonstrated in recent cases its inclination to hold the line on
that exemption. As suggested by the Supreme Court in the National
Muffler case, the time and efforts of interested parties would be better
spent lobbying in Congress for a statutory amendment to section 501
(c)(6), than in trying to make new law in the courts. 9 '
To the extent that business, civic, economic and fiscal interests
come to bear on the issue whether to expand or contract the business
league exemption, it is a matter of political policy, which is beyond the
scope of this article, the purpose of which is to analyze the current
status of the exemption. However, in so far as the controlling case law
of the present day is confused, ambiguous, ignores precedential au-
thority and leaves gaps in the application of the exemption, it is a
procedural matter. From the viewpoint of a tax planner, this author
would offer some suggstions to Congress in order to clarify the law in
order to facilitate planning,
In that regard, it is urged that when Congress next considers section
501(c)(6), an amendment should be enacted to resolve many of the
existing problems discussed above. Besides thoroughly reviewing the
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pertinent regulation in its entirety with a view toward possible nega-
tion of some portions, Congress should particularly address the issue
whether to endorse or reject the doctrine of noscitur a sociis in this
context. If the legislature decides to preserve that doctrine and the at-
tendant "line of business" requirement, then in light of the National
Muffler decision, a statutory line should be drawn delineating which
types of organizations are sufficiently "industrywide" to qualify for
the exemption. Along those lines, it would be appropriate to define the
term "industry" for purposes of the "line of business" requirement.
Congress should also expressly adopt or reject another aspect of the
"line of business" requirement left unresolved by the National Muf-
fler case, i.e., the reasonable businessman standard enunciated in Asso-
ciated Industries. Moreover, in view of the innovation or mistake
made by the Tax Court in Master Barbers regarding the qualitative
and quantitative tests, Congress would be performing a service for tax
planners by statutorily identifying which of those tests apply to the
"regular business" and the "particular services" requirements. Another
issue for legislative action is that of determining the extent to which
passive, as opposed to active, organizational involvement in providing
services (e.g., health and life insurance, legal and medical services,
etc.) to members will be permitted without destroying the exemption.
Regardless of the particular policy adopted by Congress on the issue
of relaxing or tightening the business league exemption, all interests
will be served by improving the opportunities for tax planning by
eliminating existing inconsistencies and ambiguities in the law. Since
no court has disputed that Congress has the constitutional power to
grant or deny the subject exemption, both the regulation and the court
decisions are at best interpretations of the legislative mandate. Thus, as
the ultimate authority, it is appropriate that Congress should seize the
initiative and clarify the matter once and for all.
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